Apple has issued a public objection, via Bloomberg, to Bill C-22, a piece of legislation under debate in Canada. The company argues that the bill, which would give intelligence and law enforcement agencies access to user data, would weaken the encryption and privacy protections built into its products. Google and Meta are also lobbying Canadian senators over the same bill.

What happened?

Bill C-22 could, with approval from Canada's intelligence commissioner, require companies to build certain tools, and could require some providers to retain connection metadata for up to six months. Lawmakers added safeguards stating that companies without access to encryption keys cannot be forced to decrypt data, and that no deliberate security vulnerabilities can be introduced. While Apple says it welcomes these revisions, it maintains that the law would still undermine data protection capabilities. Representatives from Meta, Signal, and Tailscale are also expected to testify before the senate committee.

Why does it matter?

This debate isn't new — it's the latest link in a familiar chain. In 2016, Apple fought the FBI in court over a request to unlock the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone, arguing that "a backdoor opened once is open to everyone." The United Kingdom followed a similar path with the Online Safety Act and amendments to the Investigatory Powers Act; in response, Apple disabled its end-to-end encrypted iCloud backup feature (Advanced Data Protection) for users in the UK. In the European Union, the "chat control" debate has been circling the same axis for years: a proposal to scan message content to detect child abuse material, effectively punching a hole through encryption.

What makes Canada different here is that it's a Five Eyes member that has typically stayed quiet on this front. The US, UK, and Australia have pursued an aggressive line on encryption access for years, while Canada has so far kept a lower profile. A Five Eyes country putting this kind of step into formal legislation could set a reference point for other members of the intelligence-sharing network. The safeguards lawmakers added — no compulsion for companies without the key, a ban on deliberate vulnerabilities — look reasonable on paper, but that's exactly where Apple's objection lands: the line between "weakening" and "backdoor" can blur in practice.

Who does this affect, and how?

CaseApproachOutcome
US – FBI/Apple (2016)Court-ordered demand to break encryptionApple resisted; FBI found an alternative method
UK – Online Safety ActMandated scanning/accessApple disabled advanced encryption in the UK
Canada – Bill C-22Legal framework mandating tool-buildingNot yet law, under senate review

The table shows just how limited companies' real options are: either comply with the law and change the architecture, or restrict certain features in that market. Even though Canada's market is small, the text of this law could serve as precedent for similar bills elsewhere — especially given the logic of intelligence-sharing within the Five Eyes alliance.

What's next?

Senate committee hearings are ongoing, and testimony from Meta, Signal, and Tailscale could shape the law's final form. Signal and Tailscale's involvement matters, since both companies have already put end-to-end encryption at the core of their business models — their objections are likely to be more technical and leave less room for compromise than Apple's. If the law passes as written, it's plausible Apple would restrict certain privacy features in Canada, the way it did in the UK.

In the end, this is neither a "disaster" nor a trivial procedural matter: even with safeguards added, a Five Eyes country building legal ground for encryption access sets a precedent for the allies that have stayed quiet — and shows that this debate hasn't ended, it's just shifted geography.