Back-to-back reports from the Financial Times and The New York Times show that the US export ban meant to keep Nvidia chips out of China has largely remained in place only on paper. A network centered on former Megaspeed executive Alice Huang is alleged to have moved Nvidia chips to buyers in China through gambling industry bosses, hundreds of shell companies, and an alleged Cambodia-based criminal group. The picture painted by the two newspapers once again shows that export controls on AI chips are strict in theory but riddled with holes in practice.

What happened?

According to the Financial Times report published Saturday, Huang's network is linked to major gambling industry figures and a criminal organization alleged to operate in Cambodia. A day earlier, The New York Times published a report connecting companies tied to the same network to China's military supply chain. Read together, the two reports don't depict a single smuggler but a multi-layered distribution network made up of hundreds of interlocking companies.

Why it matters

The US effort to restrict exports of advanced AI chips began in late 2022 and has expanded over time. Nvidia first tried to stay within the limits using slightly performance-reduced "China-specific" models (such as the A800 and H800); Washington then brought those models under the restrictions as well. Buyer verification and end-user declaration processes were subsequently tightened. But each tightening did little more than add one more layer of complexity to the chain of intermediaries. It was already known, from Nvidia's own disclosures, that a significant portion of its revenue is effectively billed through hubs like Singapore where the hardware never actually goes; these new reports show who sits at the end of that billing chain.

What's genuinely new is that at the end of the chain is not a conventional tech supplier but the gambling industry and an alleged criminal economy. Cambodia-based networks have already drawn US sanctions attention recently over online fraud compounds and gambling sites. The cash flows of such organizations largely move through channels that are difficult to trace. AI chips—a high-value, low-volume product that can change hands easily—make an ideal asset class for such a network. This shows that export controls have become not merely a matter of auditing contracts between companies, but a struggle intertwined with financial crime.

Why is enforcement so easily circumvented?

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), part of the US Department of Commerce, has a staff too small to monitor global trade flows relative to the volume of transactions covered by the restrictions. Each new rule forces intermediaries to hide one layer deeper—it doesn't eliminate them.

PeriodMeasure takenKnown circumvention method
Late 2022Restrictions on high-performance GPU exportsPerformance-reduced "China-specific" models (A800, H800)
Late 2023Reduced-performance models also brought under restrictionsBilling through third countries (Singapore, Malaysia)
2024-2025Tightened end-user declarations and buyer verificationLayers of shell companies, intermediaries linked to the gambling industry

What's next?

A new response from Congress, BIS sanctions against the named companies, and Nvidia once again defending its compliance processes are all expected. Nvidia has so far not extended its responsibility beyond buyer verification; the company continues to maintain that it cannot guarantee where the hardware it sells physically ends up. That pushes the debate toward the question of where the chipmaker's responsibility ends and where the government's oversight burden begins. Hardware-based "location verification" proposals being discussed in the US could resurface following these reports.

The reality is this: the export ban isn't stopping AI chips from reaching China—it's raising the cost and risk of doing so. Criminal networks already appear willing to take on that risk, which raises serious doubts about the regime's deterrent power.